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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal 
Circuit”) has long been viewed as a promoter of the patent system.1  
Two decades of experience offer much evidence to support this view.  
The subject matter judged amenable to patenting has expanded from 
traditional technologies to the entire range of human endeavor.2  
The consequences of infringement have been made more severe.3  
The court has held a circumspect view of antitrust, misuse, and other 
principles that might allay the exclusive rights associated with granted 
patents.4  By virtually any measure, patents are more prominent than 
a generation ago.5  Judge Richard Posner’s recent observation that 
specialized courts become boosters of their specialty would seem to 
have a great deal of support.6 
Yet in recent years, the view that the Federal Circuit serves as a 
patent law proponent has become oversimplified.  In a series of 
unexpected developments, the court has laid siege against the 
doctrine of equivalents.7  Such devices as prosecution history 
estoppel8 and the newly minted public dedication doctrine9 have 
                                                          
 1. See Bruce Rubinstein, A Little History, 7 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 38 n.63 (Feb. 1997) 
(stating that “[t]he Court’s tilt is demonstrably in favor of patent holder . . .”); Nancy 
Rivera Brooks, Invention is Often the Mother of Litigation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at 1 
(reporting Professor John Wiley’s view that the Federal Circuit is a “strongly pro-
patent court”). 
 2. See generally John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. 
REV. 1139 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions] 
(suggesting that few restraints now bind the sorts of subject matter that may be 
appropriated via the patent system). 
 3. See generally Robert D. Taylor, Twenty Years of the Federal Circuit:  An Overview, 
716 PLI/PAT 16-19 (2002) (discussing the available infringement remedies for the 
Federal Circuit); William A. Morrison, The Impact of the Creation of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit on the Availability of Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Patent 
Infringement, 23 IND. L. REV. 169 (1990) (examining the various standards for 
preliminary relief in injunction cases). 
 4. See, e.g., Peter M. Boyle et al., Antitrust Law at the Federal Circuit:  Red Light or 
Green Light at the IP-Antitrust Intersection?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 739 (2002) (noting 
references by the Federal Circuit in its recent jurisprudence to “a broad antitrust 
immunity enjoyed by patent owners”). 
 5. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 12. 
 6. See Declan McCullagh, Left Gets Nod From Right On Copyright Law, 
CNETNews.com (Nov. 20, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-966595.html 
(reporting observations of Judge Richard Posner during a November 2002 lecture, 
including his statement that “[a] specialized court tends to see itself as a booster of 
its specialty.”). 
 7. See Scott J. Fields, Another Coffin Nail in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 27 PA. L. 
WEEKLY, June 24, 2002, at S5 (examining the Federal Circuit’s recent treatment of the 
doctrine). 
 8. See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel:  Patent Administration and the Failure 
of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159 (2002). 
 9. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 62 
FINALTHOMASA.PRINTER.DOC 8/15/2003  1:43 PM 
2003] FORMALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 773 
constrained the doctrine of equivalents to an extent not seen during 
the history of the Federal Circuit.  We lack experience with these 
sudden changes to our patent jurisprudence, but suspicion is afoot 
that recent Federal Circuit thinking will increase the cost of patent 
acquisition, augment the burdens of patent administration, and 
encourage free riders—trends that make both the patent system, and 
the process of innovation, less attractive alternatives.10 
Developments in the law of nonobviousness present mixed results.11  
By increasing the evidentiary showing needed to demonstrate a 
motivation to combine references, the Federal Circuit has continued 
its trend of lowering the standard of nonobviousness.12  A lenient view 
of nonobviousness is ordinarily seen as inventor-friendly and pro-
patent.  But this trend allows the patenting of marginal inventions, 
increasing the possibility that primary inventors will have to share the 
rewards of their pioneering inventions with follow-on inventors of 
improvements.  A diminished nonobviousness standard cuts both 
ways for innovators. 
At first blush, these divergent strands of Federal Circuit patent 
jurisprudence seem to resist a unifying explanation.  But closer 
inspection shows that in all of them runs a common thread:  the drift 
toward simple rules.  Where the Federal Circuit once resolved issues 
based upon “all the facts and circumstances,” it now more often 
applies a discrete list of factors.13  Where the court once employed 
standards, it now employs rules.14  Where the court once had dense 
                                                          
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (establishing the rule that subject 
matter that is disclosed, but not claimed in a patent, is dedicated to the public 
domain). 
 10. See, e.g., Kelly L. Morron, Supreme Court’s Ruling Will Likely Increase Costs of 
Patent Litigation, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 5 (July 2002) (discussing a projected 
increase in the cost of patent litigation stemming from the Supreme Court’s Festo 
decision); Kin-Wah Tong & Robert M. Brush, Patent Prosecution in Light of Festo, 11 
N.J. LAWYER 1507 (2002) (expanding on the increased costs of patent litigation post-
Festo).  See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 
558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated by 535 U.S. 722, 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (2002). 
 11. See generally Robert Desmond, Nothing Seems “Obvious” to the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit:  The Federal Circuit, Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms the 
Standard of Obviousness Under the Patent Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 455, 465-83 (1993) 
(providing an historical overview of the changing definition of “obviousness” prior to 
and after the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
 12. See generally John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker:  Comparative 
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 727, 728-44 (2002). 
 13. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998) 
(acknowledging that the totality of the circumstances test is unnecessarily vague and 
thus should be rejected). 
 14. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (adding public dedication doctrine to the set of rules, 
including prosecution history estoppel, prior art limitations, and the all limitations 
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rules, they have become leaner.15  In short, the Federal Circuit has 
embraced an increasingly formal jurisprudence. 
The term “formalism” is not necessarily a pejorative.16  Advocates of 
formally realized rules argue that they reduce judicial discretion, lead 
to more certain outcomes and provide private actors with the 
certainty necessary to order their affairs in an efficient fashion.17  The 
judge-made law governing the doctrine of equivalents provides a 
striking example.  Once a ruleless determination dominated by vague 
standards and jury verdicts, equivalent infringement has become far 
more predictable under the stewardship of the Federal Circuit.18 
Yet formalism brings familiar criticisms as well.  Bright-line rules 
may prevent the fine-tuning needed to reach individualized 
judgments and instead encourage behavior to the boundaries of 
prohibited conduct.19  In an era where the doctrine of equivalents has 
become increasingly cabined, for example, competitors may 
permissibly practice to the limit of the precise wordings of patent 
claims.20  The drive to formalism may also distance the patent law 
from innovation policy.  When deciding whether inventions from a 
particular sphere of endeavor should be patented, for example, the 
Federal Circuit does not query into that field’s pace of innovation, 
need for interoperability, or industrial structure.  The court merely 
asks whether the invention is minimally useful.21  When resolving 
                                                          
rule, that constrain the doctirne of equivalents). 
 15. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the Freeman-Walter-Abele utility 
standard); see also infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (defining the Freeman-
Walter-Abele standard, which was used to deny software patents for mathematical 
formulas that lacked physical applications). 
 16. See Robert S. Summers, How Law is Formal and Why it Matters, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1165, 1225-27 (1997) (arguing that inventive aspects of the law contribute 
beneficially to the creation of new varieties of social and civil life, and that formalism 
is vital to this process). 
 17. See Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 934, 934 (1999) (asserting that the certainty derived from formally- 
realized rules promotes fairness and economic efficiency, while remaining relatively 
impervious to elements of coercion). 
 18. See Christina Y. Lai, Comment, A Dysfunctional Formalism:  How Modern Courts 
Are Undermining the Doctrine of Equivalents, 44 UCLA L. REV. 2031, 2034 (1997) 
(commenting on judicial application of the doctrine of equivalents and the 
uncertainty that ensued). 
 19. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) 
(clarifying the debate between rules and standards by outlining the advantages and 
disadvantages of each). 
 20. See Graver Tank v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 85 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 328, 330 (1950) (observing that “[o]utright and forthright duplication is a 
dull and very rare type of infringement.  To prohibit no other would place the 
inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form.”). 
 21. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that an invention is 
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issues under the doctrine of equivalents, the court does not weigh 
improvement and imitation.  The court instead looks to see whether 
an accused equivalent infringement is foreseeable or dedicated to the 
public.22  We can imagine a patent law as dynamic as the innovative 
industries it is said to support, but an orientation towards rules 
threatens to make the patent law hidebound and unresponsive to 
changing conditions. 
This Article considers the prevailing trend in Federal Circuit patent 
jurisprudence towards formalism.  In Part I, this Article provides a 
brief background into adjudicative rule formalism and the rules-
standards debate.  Applying these concepts to the patent law, Part II 
reviews these trends in five areas of the Federal Circuit’s patent 
jurisprudence:  the on-sale bar, patent eligibility, the public 
dedication doctrine, prosecution history estoppel and obviousness.  
Part III of this Article offers explanations for the Federal Circuit’s 
formalist turn in view of the court’s history, structure and the nature 
of its jurisdiction. 
Part IV of this Article casts a wary glance at the prevailing trend 
towards adjudicative rule formalism in the patent law.  Although 
prompted by laudable goals and encouraged by the patent bar, the 
Federal Circuit’s increasing orientation towards rulemaking may 
negatively impact innovation policy, lead to heavy burdens upon 
patent administration, and fail to realize the goals of certainty and 
predictability so often ascribed to adjudicative rule formalism.  This 
Article closes with a few cautious predictions about the trend towards 
formalism at the Federal Circuit. 
I. ADJUDICATIVE RULE FORMALISM 
The term “formalism” is not one of precision.  Judicial formalism 
seems to come in many flavors.23  A law that neither rich nor poor can 
spend the night on a bench in Lafayette Square might be termed 
formalist.24  So might the view that formal reasoning can deduce a 
                                                          
eligible for patenting if it achieves a useful, concrete, and tangible result). 
 22. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1051, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (establishing the “public 
dedication doctrine”); see also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 
1424-25, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1105-06 (1997) (rejecting use of the doctrine of 
equivalents where patentee should have foreseen the limitations of its narrowly 
drafted claims). 
 23. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 
(1999) (identifying several modes of modern legal formalism). 
 24. Lafayette Square is a small park in downtown Washington, D.C., across from 
the White House.  It is adjacent to the Howard T. Markey Building, which houses the 
Federal Circuit. 
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needed principle from existing legal norms within a logically 
coherent system.  It is formalist, theorists say, to determine the 
validity of law by examining its pedigree and procedural correctness, 
rather than its substantive content.25 
The belief that legal norms should be formally realized wherever 
possible is another sort of formalism.  This so-called “adjudicative 
rule formalism” is a prescriptive doctrine that encourages public 
officials to specify the law in advance of its application.  Adjudicative 
rule formalism counsels that lawmakers should, where possible, 
stipulate bright-line rules instead of vague standards.26  The 
commandment not to drive in excess of fifty-five miles per hour is a 
familiar rule, while a possible alternative, a prohibition not to drive at 
excessive speed, is an exemplary standard.  The range of legal 
commands may be placed on a continuum from the most rulelike, 
where judicial discretion is cabined, to the most standards-oriented, 
where judicial discretion is encouraged.27 
Proponents of adjudicative rule formalism explain that a “law of 
rules” yields many benefits.  Bright-line rules are said to lower the 
costs of decision-making and ensure the similar treatment of similarly 
situated individuals.28  Rules offer sharp boundaries of conduct that is 
permissible or forbidden, advocates contend, providing private 
parties with the certainty they require to engage in value-maximizing 
activities, including investment and marketplace transactions.29 In 
contrast, supporters of standards assert that they provide the 
flexibility needed for individualized judgments.  Standards are said to 
be most appropriate in dynamic environments, where new and 
unforeseen situations can arise.  Standards also avoid the negative 
consequences of rules, including the encouragement of disfavored 
behavior on the cusp of the prohibited activity.30 
The value of debate over adjudicative rule formalism has been 
roundly disputed.  The arguments in favor of rules or standards have 
become repetitive and routine, stated quickly in a variety of contexts 
                                                          
 25. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 936-37 (asserting that adjudicative rule 
formalism directs judges to “make rules not standards” and to “treat the law as 
consisting only of express, positive legal norms”). 
 26. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 636 (1999) (outlining arguments for and against rule formalism based 
upon a perceived need for flexibility). 
 27. See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1275, 1294-95 (2002). 
 28. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 136-40 (1997). 
 29. See Michelman, supra note 17, at 934 (asserting that economic efficiency 
underlies the certainty of rule formalism). 
 30. See Schlag, supra note 19, at 384. 
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but failing to lead to productive discourse.31  The rules versus 
standard debate nonetheless remains a traditional lens for viewing 
the law, and the patent law in particular.32  Perhaps this is so because 
patent law is the most heavily structured of intellectual property 
disciplines.  Patents arise only through a ponderous acquisition 
proceeding, and their scope is bounded by precisely worded claims.  
No wonder, then, that the debate over rules and standards in the 
patent law has a long history.33 
Like most succinct explanations, the formalist turn does not answer 
all questions about our two decades of experience with the Federal 
Circuit.  The Federal Circuit has yet to waive its Wands factors 
concerning the enablement requirement, for example, in favor of a 
more discrete rule.34  Other lists of factors and subjective inquiries, 
most notably the notorious written description requirement35 and 
nascent doctrine of prosecution laches,36 also still dot the terrain of 
patent jurisprudence.  Yet there is little doubt a formalist movement 
is afoot and potentially holds dramatic consequences for the patent 
system. These accelerating trends lend the traditional rules-standards 
debate a renewed vitality for assessing prevailing trends of 
contemporary patent law. 
                                                          
 31. See id. (noting that it is generally possible to argue both that deterrence is 
best served by both rules and standards). 
 32. See Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law:  The On Sale Bar, 
the Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1151, 1158-69 (1994) (identifying doctrinal areas in which the Federal Circuit should 
take into account the value of having a settled rule). 
 33. See generally William Macomber, Judicial Discretion in Patent Causes, 24 YALE L.J. 
99 (1914) (providing an example of early debates over doctrinal authority in patent 
law). 
 34. See Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 546 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986) 
(establishing eight factors for determining whether data disclosed in a patent 
application enabled practice of the invention without undue experimentation:  
(1) the breadth of the claims; (2) the unpredictability of the art; (3) the amount of 
experimentation; (4) the extent of guidance presented; (5) the presence of working 
examples; (6) the nature of the invention; (7) the state of the prior art; and (8) the 
relative skill of those in the field to be considered in determining undue 
experimentation); see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 
1406 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (adopting explicitly the factors established in Ex parte Forman). 
 35. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 2002 WL 1592885, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (collecting opinions relating to the denial of a petition 
for rehearing en banc suggesting deep disagreement over the written description 
requirement). 
 36. See  Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing doctrine of prosecution laches). 
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II. FIVE EASIER PIECES OF PATENT JURISPRUDENCE 
In a 1992 dissent from an en banc majority, Judge Plager found 
support from the familiar Shaker song extolling the virtue of 
simplicity.  “‘Tis the gift to be simple,’” he quoted, a notion that in his 
view was particularly applicable to legal principles.37  Judge Plager’s 
position did not carry the majority that day, but his promotion of 
rules at the expense of standards proved more enduring.  During the 
second decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence, patent 
jurisprudence has become increasingly oriented towards simple rules.  
This Article next offers five examples of the trend towards 
adjudicative rule formalism within the patent law. 
A. The On-Sale Bar 
Section 102(b) of the Patent Act in part provides that if an 
invention is “on sale” more than one year before an application is 
filed concerning that invention, then no patent should issue.38  The 
on-sale bar encourages inventors to file patent applications in a 
timely fashion, a sound incentive with a number of policy 
promptings.39  Punctual filings maintain the integrity of a patent term 
that ordinarily extends twenty years from the date the application is 
filed.  They also stimulate the seasonable disclosure of information 
through published patent documentation. In addition, timely filings 
diminish the possibility that members of the public might come to 
believe that proprietary technologies actually lie in the public 
domain, and rely upon that belief to their detriment.  The one-year 
period also allows inventors time to decide whether to enter the 
patent system or not, and to prepare applications if they choose to do 
so. 
Determination of whether particular commercial activities 
triggered the on-sale bar has sometimes proven a subtle affair.  
During its first decade and well into its second, the Federal Circuit 
employed a “totality of the circumstances” standard to determine 
whether an inventor’s commercial activity had triggered the on-sale 
                                                          
 37. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1047, 22 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (providing that “[a] person shall be entitled to a 
patent unless . . . (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, 
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States . . . .”). 
 39. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61, 211 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 867, 
873 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (reviewing the legislative history and case law that establish the 
policies underlying the on-sale bar). 
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bar.40  Believing that the on-sale bar “does not lend itself to 
formulation into a set of precise requirements,”41 the court instead 
embarked upon a policy-driven analysis in on-sale bar cases.42  Such 
considerations as the inventor’s intent, the completeness of the 
invention and the nature of the transaction between inventor and 
purchaser were weighed in light of section 102(b) policies to decide 
whether the circumstances prevented the grant of a patent.43 
Robust debate proceeded over the wisdom of the Federal Circuit 
approach, most of it along the familiar lines of the rules-standards 
debate.  On one hand, the standard allowed the direct invocation of 
innovation polices—“the purposes of the on-sale bar, in effect, define 
its terms,” the court explained44—and provided the flexibility to do 
justice in particular cases.  On the other, the Federal Circuit itself 
observed that a totality of the circumstances standard had been 
criticized as “unnecessarily vague.”45  Some observers believed that the 
lack of predictability regarding the on-sale bar made it difficult for 
inventors and competitors alike to assess the validity of issued 
patents.46  The totality of the circumstances approach was 
characterized as an ad hoc, after-the-fact determination that could be 
obtained only after a costly trial and appeal.47 
The 1998 Supreme Court opinion in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics48 
marked a wholesale shift in on-sale bar principles from standards into 
rules.49  Pfaff was the named inventor on a patent directed towards a 
                                                          
 40. See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that determining whether 
an invention was on sale requires a consideration of all the circumstances 
surrounding a sale or offer to sell, including the stage of development and the 
nature of the invention). 
 41. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1465, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that “reduction to practice” is not an 
absolute requirement to the on-sale bar, but is an important factor in considering all 
the circumstances of a sale or an offer to sell). 
 42. See id., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472. 
 43. See id., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472; see also David W. Carstens & Craig Allen 
Nard, Conception and the “On Sale” Bar, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 412 (1993). 
 44. J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1582, 229 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 435, 438 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 45. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 n.2, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1453 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 46. See Vincent J. Allen, The On Sale Bar:  When Will Inventors Receive Some 
Guidance?, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 125, 132-33 (1999) (arguing that the many different 
standards used in applying the on-sale bar has created confusion for inventors and 
practitioners). 
 47. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:  
Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale 
Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 942-45 (2000) (stating that balancing policy 
considerations was problematic because it required a factual inquiry for each case). 
 48. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998). 
 49. Id. at 68-69, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
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computer chip socket.  Prior to the critical date, Pfaff presented his 
inventive concept to representatives of Texas Instruments.  Although 
Pfaff had not yet constructed even a single prototype, the Texas 
Instruments representatives nonetheless placed a purchase order for 
a number of sockets.  A third-party manufacturer ultimately produced 
a working embodiment of the invention after the critical date.  
Following the issuance of the chip socket patent, Pfaff brought suit 
against a competitor, which argued that the claims were invalid due 
to the on-sale bar.50 
The Court agreed with the defendant that the on-sale bar applied.  
Discarding the prevailing Federal Circuit standard, Justice Stevens set 
forth a two-part rule to determine whether an invention was “on sale” 
within the meaning of section 102(b).51  First, the Court explained, 
the product must be “the subject of a commercial offer for sale.”52  
The Court believed that this test satisfied the inventive community’s 
desire for certainty, because inventors should be able to choose the 
time at which they commence commercial marketing of their 
inventions.53 
The second part of the test was that “the invention must be ready 
for patenting.”54  The Court recognized at least two ways to satisfy this 
condition.  The invention may have been physically constructed:  an 
“actual reduction to practice” in the language of the patent law.55  
Alternatively, “drawings or other descriptions of the invention that 
were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to 
practice the invention” would also suffice.56  Applying its newly crafted 
rule, the Court recognized that Pfaff had both accepted a purchase 
order and delivered detailed engineering specifications and diagrams 
to his contracting partner more than one year before the critical 
date.57  The Court concluded that Pfaff had triggered the on-sale bar, 
and therefore his patent was invalid.58 
The Supreme Court decision to intervene in the Pfaff  litigation 
puzzled some observers.  Even among patent specialists of the mid-
1990s, resolution of the finer points of the on-sale bar would not have 
ranked high on anyone’s list of issues most in need of High Court 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 59, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
 51. Id. at 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 52. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 53. Id. at 66, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 54. Id. at 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 55. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 56. Id. at 67-68, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 57. Id. at 68, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 58. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
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resolution.  Yet the Pfaff decision may have been more influential 
than commonly assumed.  The Court’s decided preference for rules 
over standards appears to have sent strong signals to the Federal 
Circuit.  It is perhaps not a coincidence that adjudicative rule 
formalism achieved an upswing in Federal Circuit jurisprudence in 
the late 1990s following the issuance of Pfaff.  No patent law doctrine 
has been more significantly and surprisingly touched by a rules-
oriented approach than the doctrine of equivalents, a topic this 
Article turns to next. 
B. The Public Dedication Doctrine 
The recent ferment in the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence 
concerning the doctrine of equivalents has reflected a movement 
towards bright-line rules.  The doctrine of equivalents was effectively 
in a state of rulelessness, dominated by a vague function-way-result 
standard, expert testimony, and jury verdicts.59  Today more certainty 
prevails with equivalent infringement, principally because the 
circumstances in which the doctrine will apply have been narrowly 
cabined.60 
The newly forged “public dedication” doctrine forms a primary 
example.  Sometimes the claims of a patent are not as broad as the 
technical disclosure contained in that patent’s written description.  
Proprietors of such patents have occasionally charged competitors 
with infringement even though they practice subject matter that has 
been disclosed but not claimed.  For example, a patent might 
describe the use of all rare earth elements as one component of the 
invention, but recite only the use of cerium in its claims.  If a 
competitor employs another rare earth element, such as thulium, the 
question arises whether that competitor should be held to infringe 
under the doctrine of equivalents.  Resolution of this recurring issue 
has also centered upon the rules versus standards debate. 
At one extreme, as represented by the 1996 Federal Circuit 
decision in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,61 is the rule that subject matter 
disclosed but not claimed in a patent application is, as a matter of 
                                                          
 59. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  THE 
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 480 (2003) (explaining that under the 
doctrine of equivalents, the scope of patent protection may be expanded beyond the 
literal wording of a patent’s claim to accused infringements that are not substantially 
different from the claimed invention). 
 60. See Lai, supra note 18, at 2056-57 (1997) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s 
application of prosecution history estoppel limited reliance on the doctrine of 
equivalents). 
 61.  86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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law, dedicated to the public.62  Under this view, by failing to claim the 
full extent of the disclosed subject matter, an applicant deprives the 
Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) of the opportunity to 
consider whether this subject matter is patentable.63  Allowing an 
applicant to obtain narrow claims from the Patent Office, and then 
assert broader protection for unclaimed alternatives described in the 
specification, would defeat the fundamental principle that a patent’s 
claims define its scope of proprietary rights.64 
The other end of the spectrum, adopted by the 1998 Federal 
Circuit opinion in YBM Magnex, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission,65 was that no per se rule should dictate whether subject 
matter included in the written description, but not claimed, is 
equivalent to the claimed invention.66  Proponents of this standard 
emphasized that “the doctrine of equivalents seeks to establish a just 
balance between the purpose of claims to define and give notice of 
what is patented, and the judicial responsibility to avoid a ‘fraud on 
the patent’ based on insubstantial changes from the patented 
invention.”67  Whether the accused infringement was disclosed but 
not claimed in the asserted patent simply formed one of many factors 
to consider in the equivalency determination. 
Faced with a conflict in its precedents, the Federal Circuit 
eventually opted for the rule of Maxwell over the YBM 
Magnex standard.68  In its 2002 decision in Johnson & Johnston 
Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc.,69 the en banc court announced a 
“public dedication doctrine.”70  Under this unwavering principle, 
subject matter that is disclosed in a patent, but not claimed, may not 
be appropriated through the doctrine of equivalents.71 
Those familiar with the rules-standards debate would find much of 
its rhetoric in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning.  The claims alone 
should serve as the measure of the patent’s propriety rights, the 
majority explained, providing appropriate notice to the Patent Office 
and interested competitors alike.72  Judge Newman’s dissenting 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 1108, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 63. See id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (discussing the purpose of the public 
dedication rule). 
 64. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 65. 145 F.3d 1317, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 66. Id. at 1322, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 67. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 68. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 69. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225. 
 70. Id. at 1054, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 71. Id. at 1055, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 72. Id. at 1054, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
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opinion instead found merit in a “more sensitive legal framework 
than the bludgeon of a per se rule.”73  Given the diversity of 
technological circumstances and claiming practices within the 
modern patent system, she reasoned, a flexible standard would better 
serve innovation policy and the patent community.74  Adjudicative 
rule formalism would continue to prevail within the law of the 
doctrine of equivalents, however, as demonstrated by 
contemporaneous developments at the Federal Circuit concerning 
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. 
C. Prosecution History Estoppel 
Prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining a 
claim construction before a court that would include subject matter 
surrendered at the Patent Office during prosecution.75  It is named 
for the “prosecution history” or “file wrapper,” the publicly available 
papers that document the dialogue between the inventor and 
examiner during the patent acquisition.  If the court concludes that 
an applicant relinquished certain subject matter in order to secure 
the allowance of her claims, then as a patentee she may not employ 
the doctrine of equivalents to recapture the renounced subject 
matter.76 
Courts have struggled over the extent to which prosecution history 
estoppel impacts the doctrine of equivalents.  The following example, 
using dated technology, illustrates these difficulties.  Suppose that, 
prior to the invention of the transistor, an inventor presents a claim 
reciting a computer that in part uses an “electric switch.”  The Patent 
Office examiner rejects the claim based upon prior art.  The inventor 
then narrows the claim by deleting the term “electric switch” and 
replacing it with the term “vacuum tube.”  The Patent Office 
examiner then approves the claim.  Subsequently, near the end of the 
patent’s term, the inventor brings suit against a competitor that 
manufactures computers using a new, state-of-the-art device—the 
transistor. 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 1067, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240 (stating that per se rules are only 
appropriate when “the policy is so clear and the outcome is so inevitable”). 
 75. See Pharmacia & UpJohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77, 
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Lai, supra note 18, at 2057 
(explaining that prosecution history estoppel bars application of the doctrine of 
equivalents to claims that were amended during patent prosecution). 
 76. See, e.g., Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1328-29, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1875 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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The rules-standard debate has again controlled the judicial 
dialogue regarding the scope of equivalents left to an amended claim 
limitation.  Under the rule, known here as the “strict bar” approach, 
if a claim limitation has been amended during prosecution, then no 
range of equivalents exists for that amended limitation.77  Continuing 
the example noted above, because transistors can act as electric 
switches, the patentee is deemed to have confined his invention to 
vacuum tubes and purposefully disclaimed transistors.  Prosecution 
history estoppel would therefore completely defeat the patentee’s 
charge of infringement. 
In contrast, courts applying a standard would assess the reason for 
the claim amendment to determine the remaining scope of the 
doctrine of equivalents.  This “flexible bar” standard was more 
lenient to patentees.78  Prosecution history estoppel would apply only 
where the court concluded that a person skilled in the art would 
reasonably believe that the patentee had surrendered subject matter 
during prosecution.79  To continue the previous example, no 
reasonable competitor would believe that the patentee had 
surrendered subject matter by amending the claims.  At the time the 
patentee made the amendment, the transistor had yet to be invented!  
As a result, the court would likely hold that prosecution history 
estoppel did not apply, and proceed to the doctrine of equivalents 
analysis. 
The Federal Circuit has traditionally employed a flexible bar 
approach.  In its Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.80 
decision, however, the Federal Circuit abruptly announced its shift to 
a strict bar approach.81  Here the plaintiff, Festo, owned the Stoll and 
Carroll patents.82  Each patent concerned magnetic rodless 
                                                          
 77. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (comparing the “complete bar” 
and the “flexible bar” approaches), vacated by 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1705 (2002).  According to the Festo court, the complete bar serves the public 
because it provides notice as to the scope of a patent, eliminates public speculation 
as to the subject matter surrendered by an amendment, and provides certainty to the 
process of determining a patent’s scope.  234 F.3d at 576-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1878-79. 
 78. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 576-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878-79 (arguing that 
the uncertainty inherent in the flexible bar approach is an obstacle to satisfying the 
policy objectives of the Patent Act). 
 79. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879 (criticizing the “flexible bar” approach 
because under that standard, only the prior art marks the limits of a claim’s scope, 
which makes the range of equivalents unascertainable). 
 80. Id. at 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865. 
 81. Id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 82. Id. at 579, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882. 
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cylinders.83  During prosecution, the claims of both patents were 
amended to require a pair of sealing rings.84  The Carroll patent was 
additionally amended to require a sleeve made of magnetizable 
material.  The accused infringer, SMC, produced a device employing 
a single, two-way sealing ring and a sleeve made of non-magnetizable 
material.85  Although the Stoll and Carroll patents were not literally 
infringed, Festo argued that infringement existed under the doctrine 
of equivalents.86  SMC in turn contended that prosecution history 
estoppel barred Festo from resorting to the doctrine.87 
The Federal Circuit applied the strict bar rule and held that 
prosecution history estoppel creates a complete bar to the doctrine of 
equivalents.88  “When a claim amendment creates prosecution history 
estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no range of 
equivalents available for the amended claim element,” the court 
explained.89  The Federal Circuit’s reasoning again appealed to the 
rhetoric of the rules-standard debate.  The court judged that 
certainty as to the scope of patent protection was paramount. 
According to the Federal Circuit, amendments should be treated as 
disclaimers and construed against the inventor.90 
Interestingly, a Supreme Court that had seemingly spawned the 
patent law’s movement away from standards this time decided the 
Federal Circuit had gone too far.91  Vacating and remanding the case, 
the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit “strict bar” rule.  
Justice Kennedy instead confirmed statements from an earlier 
doctrine of equivalents decision, Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis,92 
that had established a presumption regarding the doctrine of 
equivalents.  According to the Court, when subject matter has been 
limited via claim amendment, the patentee is presumed to have 
surrendered the asserted equivalent.93  Patentees could rebut this 
presumption by showing that at the time of the amendment, one 
                                                          
 83. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882. 
 84. Id. at 582, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884. 
 85. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884. 
 86. Id. at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882. 
 87. Id. at 584, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 88. Id. at 574, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 89. Id. at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 90. Id. at 575-76, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 91. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002) (holding that an amendment is not an absolute bar 
to the doctrine of equivalents). 
 92. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (1997). 
 93. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705. 
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skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a 
claim that would literally encompass the alleged equivalent.94 
Although Festo at first blush seems to move in the opposite 
direction from Pfaff, the Supreme Court in fact fell far short of 
returning to a “flexible bar” standard.95  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
decision largely vindicates increasingly restrictive Federal Circuit 
practices regarding the doctrine of equivalents.  The Supreme Court 
left only three slender opportunities for overcoming prosecution 
history estoppel:  that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the time 
the patentee drafted the amendment; that the rationale underlying 
the amendment bore no more than a tangential relationship to the 
equivalent in question; or that some other reason suggested that the 
patentee could not have been expected to have described the 
asserted equivalent in question.96  The facts of this case demonstrate 
that these are narrow rules indeed.  It is difficult to see how Festo can 
prevail in this litigation, for a two-way seal was probably foreseeable, 
and Festo’s amendments were likely more than tangential to a two-way 
seal.  Even following the Supreme Court’s Festo opinion, then, the 
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel remains far more rulebound 
than it was just a few years earlier. 
D. Patent Eligibility 
Determination of the sorts of inventions eligible for patenting was 
traditionally governed by a number of murky rules.  Laws of Nature—
whoever Nature is, and whatever her laws are—were held not to be 
patentable.97  Under the so-called “mental steps” rule,98 an invention 
that was principally a matter of human selection, interpretation or 
decision-making was not patentable.  The “printed matter” doctrine99 
                                                          
 94. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705. 
 95. See Tony Mauro & Brenda Sandberg, Supremes Give Leeway in ‘Festo’ Case, THE 
RECORDER, May 29, 2002, at 1 (discussing how Festo makes patents harder to enforce 
because it creates a rebuttable presumption that “an amendment was intended to 
narrow the claim,” in which case, the doctrine of equivalents would no longer 
provide protection). 
 96. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705. 
 97. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculants Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 76 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280, 281 (1947) (holding that “[h]e who discovers a hitherto 
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes.”). 
 98. See In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 556, 66 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 217, 220 (C.C.P.A. 
1945) (holding that “purely mental acts are not proper subject matter for protection 
under the patent statutes”). 
 99. See, e.g., In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385, 217 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 401, 404 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding that “[w]here the printed matter is not functionally related 
to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from prior art 
in terms of patentability.”). 
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held that information inscribed upon a substrate for purposes of 
presentation was held outside the scope of section 101—unless a 
functional relationship existed between the substrate and written 
material.  The awkwardly named Freeman-Walter-Abele test100 mandated 
that software-related inventions were not patent-eligible if the 
claimed invention was no more than mathematics, or not applied to 
an otherwise statutory process claim.101  Pedagogical techniques and 
business methods were not patentable either, as Judge Rich 
explained in 1959: 
Of course, not every kind of invention can be patented.  Invaluable 
though it may be to individuals, the public, and the national 
defense, the invention of a more effective organization of the 
materials in, and the techniques of teaching a course in physics, 
chemistry, or Russian is not a patentable invention because it is 
outside of the enumerated [statutory] categories . . . .  Also outside 
that group is one of the greatest inventions of our times, the diaper 
service.102 
The Federal Circuit finally replaced this morass with a blunt rule in 
State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group.103  There, the court held 
that a data processing system for managing a mutual fund constituted 
patentable subject matter.104  Rejecting the venerable “business 
methods” exception to patentability,105 the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the key inquiry concerning statutory subject matter involves “the 
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its 
practical utility.”106  The court stated that an invention achieving a 
“useful, concrete and tangible result,”107 rather than being merely an 
                                                          
 100. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058, 
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining the origin of this test).  
The test’s name comes from the name of the three cases that established the 
standard:  In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982), In re 
Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980), and In re Freeman, 
573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978).   
 101. See Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.2d at 1058, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037 (citing 
the claim in Abele that algorithms applied to specific processes or apparatuses, so 
long as they are necessary to the solution process and not merely dictated by the field 
of activity present statutory subject matter) . 
 102. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 393-94 
(1960) (discussing the bases for determining which inventions are patentable). 
 103. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 104. Id. at 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 105. See id. at 1375-77, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602-04 (explaining that prior 
patent applications purportedly rejected by the Federal Circuit or the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals were actually rejected on other, statutorily derived 
grounds).  According to the State Street court, the “business methods” exception 
“represented the application of some general, but no longer applicable legal 
principle,” and needed to be put “to rest.”  Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602-04. 
 106. Id. at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602. 
 107. Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544, 
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abstract concept, would be eligible for patenting.108  By collapsing the 
statutory subject matter test into a more lenient utility requirement, 
State Street Bank opened the patent system to inventions from the 
entire range of human endeavor.109 
The rule that a patent-eligible invention need only achieve a 
“useful, concrete and tangible result” has a lot of adjectives, but it is 
essentially a blunt test that has supplanted a more complex scheme of 
predecessor principles.110  In keeping with this approach, other 
exclusionary principles besides the business methods exception are 
approaching abrogation or have already met their demise. The 
printed matter doctrine stands on “questionable legal and logical 
footing,”111 the Federal Circuit has explained,112 and little, if anything 
is left of Freeman-Walter-Abele.113  Following State Street Bank, the Federal 
Circuit has admitted that “virtually anything is patentable.”114  It is 
difficult to imagine a more simple rule governing patent-eligible 
subject matter. 
Although the stated reasoning of the State Street Bank decision does 
not track the dialogue of rules and standards, the perceived 
attractions of adjudicative rule formalism nonetheless played a role in 
the Federal Circuit’s evolving stance on statutory subject matter.  The 
text of the State Street Bank opinion focused upon the judicial, 
statutory and administrative precedent that governed the subject 
matter appropriate for patenting.115  Yet earlier cases made the court 
                                                          
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 108. See id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (noting that this criteria is determinative 
“even if the useful result is expressed in numbers”). 
 109. See Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, supra note 2; see also Arti Rai, 
Addressing the Patent Gold Rush:  The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 199, 211 (2000) (noting that the number of patents and patent filings on 
methods of doing business over the Internet rose dramatically after State Street). 
 110. See Rai, supra note 109 (arguing that the State Street decision “essentially 
collapsed the patentable subject matter requirement into the utility requirement”); 
see also John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 21 (1999) (describing the physicality requirement of the old 
Freeman-Walter-Abele test as “little more than a charade”). 
 111. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 n.8, 217 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 401, 404 n.8 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 112. See id. (explaining that “the description of an element of an invention as 
printed matter tells nothing about the differences between the invention and prior 
art . . . .”). 
 113. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359-60, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1452-53 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (eliminating conclusively the 
“physical limitations” requirement of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test). 
 114. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J., dissenting from the Order 
declining the suggestion for rehearing en banc). 
 115. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373-77, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1600-04 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (surveying the 
language of Section 101 itself, as well as the administrative and judicial precedent 
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painfully aware that patent applicants often resorted to contorted 
claim-drafting techniques in order to avoid the exclusionary rules of 
patent eligibility.116  The Federal Circuit analogized these rules as the 
byzantine strands forming a Gordian knot,117 finding them easier to 
sever than to untie.118  Simpler rules were perceived as being easier 
for Patent Office examiners to apply and likely to result in patent 
instruments that were more readily understood, while working few 
effective changes upon the subject matter a persistent applicant could 
patent.    As with its other recent doctrinal shifts in patent law, the 
Federal Circuit’s move to a streamlined, porous standard of patent 
eligibility reflected the perceived benefits of adjudicative rule 
formalism. 
E. Nonobviousness 
The fundamental gatekeeper to patenting, the so-called 
“nonobviousness” requirement,119 has also grown more rulebound in 
recent years.  The inelegant term “nonobviousness” identifies the 
statutory requirement that to be patentable, an invention must not 
have been within the capabilities of a skilled artisan at the time it was 
made.120  In contrast to the more narrowly cabined novelty 
requirement, which requires that a single prior patent, publication, 
or other teaching wholly anticipate the claimed invention,  
nonobviousness more broadly reflects the entirety of teachings of the 
state of the art.121 
A conclusion of nonobviousness may be based upon a single prior 
art reference,122 but most often a patent challenger must employ 
                                                          
surrounding the provision of Title 35). 
 116. See, e.g., In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, 1912 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (describing a read-only memory as a “specific piece of apparatus” 
and holding that a claimed “auto-correlation unit” was patent eligible); In re Grams, 
888 F.2d 835, 840, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1824, 1828 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting 
patent claim where the sole physical process in one step of plaintiff’s claim was a 
series of clinical tests on individuals used to collect data for use in the algorithm at 
issue). 
 117. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061, 
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1039-40 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring) 
(describing pre-State Street law on this issue as a “twisted knot of precedent”). 
 118. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1374, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601 (deciding to 
eliminate this precedent by holding that “the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, 
applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter”). 
 119. See generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY:  CASES AND MATERIALS 644 (3d ed. 2002). 
 120. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
 121. See Glynn S. Lunney, E-Commerce:  Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents 
Symposium:  E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 392-93 (2000). 
 122. See generally Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Who is the Person Having Ordinary Skill 
in the Art?  Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 275 (2002). 
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multiple references in order to locate all the elements of the claimed 
invention.123  Suppose, for example, that a patent application claims 
the combination of a speaker and an amplifier.  A prior art search 
reveals that no single prior art reference teaches this combination.  
However, one journal article describes the speaker, and another the 
amplifier.  The issue arises whether it would have been within the 
capabilities of a skilled artisan to combine these teachings to produce 
the claimed invention. 
Here, too, the patent law has once more moved from a reflexive, 
standards-oriented combination of prior art references into a more 
formally articulated, rules-based approach.  Early law on the 
combination of references employed a standards approach.  The 
most notorious example, emanating from the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor court, was the decision of the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals in In re Winslow.124  That opinion called for the patent 
challenger to picture “the inventor as working in his shop with the 
prior art references—which he is presumed to know—hanging on the 
walls around him.”125  The decision maker would then select the 
necessary references from his workshop walls, combining them in 
order to achieve the claimed subject matter.126 
The difficulty with the Winslow image, however compelling and 
readily visualized, is that it provided no precise guidance on how a 
person of skill in the art would unite disparate teachings from the 
prior art in order to achieve the claimed combination.  At its worst, 
Winslow could be viewed as depicting inventors as being in physical 
possession of the most pertinent prior art.  The patent instrument 
would then become a blueprint for choosing from among a vast 
number of prior art references, making the conclusion of 
nonobviousness all too readily reached.127  Judge Rich recognized this 
difficulty in Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,128 where he 
noted that the Winslow tableau could not convey that helpful 
references would be interspersed alongside numerous unhelpful 
sources, and perhaps even references that taught away from the 
                                                          
 123. See C. Edward Polk & Jonathan R. Spivey, Patent Law Basics:  Understanding the 
United States Patent System, NAT’L BAR ASS’N MAG., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 16 (observing 
that the “nonobviousness” inquiry “looks to the totality of the prior art rather than a 
single reference”). 
 124. 365 F.2d 1017, 1020, 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48, 50-51 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
 125. Id., 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 51. 
 126. Id., 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 51. 
 127. Id. at 1021, 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 52 (Smith, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority in Winslow for its “hindsight reasoning” in denying Winslow’s claims). 
 128. 745 F.2d 1437, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 603 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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solution.129  Articulated in the fashion of the rules-standards debate, 
the flexibility of the Winslow tableau left too much discretion to the 
decision maker, rendered the results of the nonobviousness 
uncertain, and held the potential to deny similarly situated 
individuals equal treatment under the laws.  
Again becoming more rules-oriented, patent doctrine has placed 
increasing emphasis upon the circumstances under which references 
can be appropriately combined during the nonobviousness inquiry.  
The Federal Circuit has stressed that it is not enough that all the 
teachings of the claimed invention can be found in the prior art. 
Instead a conclusion of nonobviousness is appropriate only where a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would have been stimulated to 
combine these references to achieve the claimed invention.130  This 
inquiry ordinarily centers upon the presence of a teaching, 
motivation, or suggestion in the prior art to select and combine 
pertinent prior art references.131 
The 2002 decision In re Sang Su Lee132 presents the Federal Circuit’s 
latest thinking on the requirement of a motivation to combine.  In 
Lee, the Patent Office Board rejected an application claiming a 
method of automatically displaying functions of a video display 
device.  The method instructed users to select and adjust functions in 
order to facilitate their responses.  The Board rejected the application 
based on two references:  a television monitor with adjustments to 
facilitate viewing, along with a handbook for a video game that taught 
adjustments to expedite playing the game.  As to the combination of 
the two references, the board explained that the “conclusion of 
obviousness may be made from common knowledge and common 
sense of a person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint 
or suggestion in a particular reference.”133 
Following an appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s 
decision.  According to the court, the Board had not adequately 
demonstrated that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to 
select and combine the two references in order to achieve the 
claimed invention.134  Instead of undertaking a thorough, searching 
                                                          
 129. Id. at 1453, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 613 (likening the Winslow tableau to a 
“noxious weed” in need of reform). 
 130. In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 131. See id., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (requiring “some teaching suggestion or 
incentive,” in addition to the evidence of prior art, to support a claim for 
obviousness); see also In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 5 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (considering these factors as well). 
 132. 277 F.3d 1338, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 133. Id. at 1341, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 134. See id. at 1343-44, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (chiding the Board for using 
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inquiry of the state of the art, the Federal Circuit explained, the 
Board’s invocation of “common knowledge and common sense” 
relied upon “subjective belief and unknown authority.”135  In the 
court’s view, both the Administrative Procedure Act and Federal 
Circuit precedent obligated the Patent Office to identify specific, 
objective evidence demonstrating that a skilled artisan would have 
been led to combine the cited references.136  Reliance upon assumed 
expertise and unsupported statements was deemed “both legal error 
and arbitrary agency action.”137 
Lee and its associated case law have come a long way from Winslow.  
The Federal Circuit has effectively established a rule obliging the 
Patent Office to generate a specific factual finding of a motivation to 
combine references during its nonobviousness determinations.138  
The court has also required the Patent Office to state its conclusions 
in a fully articulated fashion.139  Although subsequent case law has 
arguably put some play in the joints of Lee,140 there can be little doubt 
that a showing of a motivation to combine cited references has 
become increasingly formalized and rule-like.  In nonobviousness, as 
with other areas of patent jurisprudence, adjudicative rule formalism 
has recently been a powerful influence. 
III. THE FORMALIST TURN AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
Patent jurisprudence increasingly reflects a trend towards 
adjudicative rule formalism.  Some of the most prominent principles 
of the patent law, governing the subject matter that can be patented, 
rights acquisition, and the scope of protection, have become more 
rulebound.141  It is not enough to say that two decades of the court’s 
                                                          
“that which the inventor taught against its teacher”) (quoting W.L. Gore v. Garlock, 
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 312-13 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 135. Id. at 1344, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 136. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 137. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 138. Id. at 1343-44, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433-34. 
 139. Id. at 1344, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 140. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (holding that the “normal” desire of scientists to improve known inventions 
provides sufficient motivation to determine a motive to combine); Novo Nordisk v. 
Becton Dickinson & Co., 304 F.3d 1216, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that expert testimony sufficed to show that practitioners possessed the 
motivation to combine certain teachings to produce a claimed invention). 
 141. See generally Lai, supra note 18, at 2031 (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s 
formalist turn in the context of its jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of 
equivalents); see also Conrad J. Dewitte, Jr., Comment, Festo Change-O?  No Way!  Why 
the Supreme Court Should Reverse the Federal Circuit’s Attack on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 
51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1323, 1335-36, 1340-53 (2002) (pointing out potential problems 
caused by the Federal Circuit’s formalist approach); Christopher T. Kent, Casenote, 
Reducing the Scope of Patent Protection and Incentives for Innovation Through Unfair 
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existence have now passed, the precedents are piling up, and a few 
modest rules have inevitably emerged.  The Federal Circuit seems 
ever more prone to the pronouncement of categorical rules meant to 
govern future patent disputes. 
An understanding of the reasons for this trend is essential to 
assessing the work of the court and projecting its future.  Fortunately, 
explanations become apparent upon examining the Federal Circuit’s 
history, structure, jurisdiction, and the practitioners that appear 
before it.  Each of these influences suggests a preference for rules 
over standards.  In view of this environment, the recent triumph of 
adjudicative rule formalism within the patent law appears not merely 
predictable.  It seems inevitable. 
Despite the passing of two decades, the legislative purpose 
underlying the creation of the Federal Circuit continues to shape the 
work of the court.  In the memorable words of Judge Young, 
Congress established a “court with a mission” when it approved the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act.142  The Federal Circuit was charged 
with providing more consistent guidance to innovative industry, the 
Patent Office, and others impacted by the patent system.143  That 
Federal Circuit opinions cite this dated congressional mandate with 
continued enthusiasm may be due in part to the absence of legislative 
involvement with the most crucial questions in patent law.144  The 
Supreme Court called for assistance on patenting biotechnology and 
software decades ago, for example,145 and more recently suggested an 
appropriate response to the doctrine of equivalents.146  Congress has 
                                                          
Application of Prosecution History Estoppel and the Recapture Rule, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
595, 616-17 (2002) (explaining the Federal Circuit’s decision to set forth bright line 
rules in this area of the law). 
 142. See Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elec., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177, 1177-78 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing the Federal Circuit as 
“different” and “a specialized court”). 
 143. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12. 
 144. See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1331, 
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1778 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress intended 
the Federal Circuit to stabilize patent litigation, improve business planning, and spur 
new innovations in science and technology), overruled on other grounds by Midwest 
Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 
1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “one of the principal purposes” of the Federal 
Circuit was to “promote uniformity in  the law with regard to” patent law); In re 
Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691, 1699 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d 
on other grounds by Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1930 (1999) 
(stating that “an expressed purpose” for creating the Federal Circuit was “to increase 
uniformity of decision making in patent cases”). 
 145. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 210 
(1980) (noting that Congress could alter Section 101 of the Patent Law to reflect 
concerns about patenting organisms produced by genetic engineering if it wished). 
 146. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997) 
(holding that “Congress can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any 
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so far failed to respond.  In view of the powerful mandate that 
accompanied its creation, and in the absence of more recent 
legislative activity, the Federal Circuit continues to serve as a maker of 
substantive patent policy. 
In its salad days, the Federal Circuit addressed this mandate by 
attempting to resolve inconsistencies in the nation’s collective patent 
jurisprudence.147  Now that the initial housecleaning has come to a 
close, the court’s mission has a different flavor.  Certainty and 
predictability have become the watchwords of the day.148  Today it is 
quite clear that an antitrust claim at the Federal Circuit will fail, that 
few innovations will fail to comprise patentable subject matter, and 
that a plaintiff-patentee basing his or her infringement theory solely 
on the doctrine of equivalents ought to reconsider its case.149   The 
Federal Circuit’s continuing drive for doctrinal stability within the 
patent law has been advanced largely through the mechanism of 
adjudicative rule formalism. 
The expectations of an increasingly outspoken patent bar remain 
in accord with congressional purposes twenty years ago.  Patent 
lawyers prefer rules. Patent lawyers draft the exclusionary rules that 
are patent claims, and then subject those rules to high-stakes 
litigation.  They also bear the consequences when the rules are 
imprecise or of inappropriate scope.  No wonder, then, that the 
patent bar has long demanded more rules and fewer standards in 
judicial decision-making.  No small number has expressed this view to 
the Federal Circuit, sometimes in strongly worded language.150  The 
persistent presentation of these views has had a felt impact upon the 
nation’s patent jurisprudence. 
The diversity and growing complexity of the subject matter within 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction might also prompt a movement 
                                                          
time it chooses.”). 
 147. See Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 2 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 303, 303 (1992) (describing Congress’s “expert intent” that the Federal Circuit 
“contribute to increased uniformity and reliability in the field of patent law”). 
 148. See Kent, supra note 141, at 623 (characterizing the Federal Circuit’s recent 
jurisprudence as favoring predictability over fairness). 
 149. See generally Taylor, supra note 3. 
 150. See, e.g., Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot:  
Emphasizing Plain Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1 (2002); William C. 
Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity:  The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with 
its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000); Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evan, The 
Charade:  Trying a Patent Case to All “Three” Juries, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (1999); 
Victorial Slind-Flor, Federal Circuit Judged Flawed, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 3, 1998, at A1; 
Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis:  The Sometimes Rough 
Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 791 (1998); Larsen E. Whipsnade & J. Cheever Loophole, Responsible Advocacy 
and Responsible Opinions at the Federal Circuit, 35 IDEA 331 (1995). 
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towards adjudicative rule formalism.  Outside of the patent field, the 
Federal Circuit must address numerous statutes of formidable length 
and intricacy.151  No single practitioner could be expected to master 
this uneven assortment of legislation and the case law accompanying 
it.152  The patent system too has become increasingly complex.153  
Patent acquisition procedures have become more convoluted, 
statutory amendments bring ever more subtle provisions into the 
Patent Act, and high technology inventions in such fields as 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology are often of mind-numbing 
perplexity.  Simple rules might be seen as providing a well-meaning 
judiciary with a thread through the labyrinth. 
The sometimes-strained relationships between the Federal Circuit 
and the tribunals it oversees also seem to counsel rules.154  District 
court judges have occasionally been outspoken over the Federal 
Circuit’s high reversal rate and perceived intrusiveness into trial 
procedures.155  Such issues as the interpretation of means-plus-
function claims156 and the standard of review157 have led to simmering 
disputes between the Federal Circuit and the Patent Office as well.  
Given this history, the Federal Circuit may have developed an interest 
in promulgating simple rules that other actors within the patent 
system may more easily apply. 
The decision-making environment of the Patent Office also weighs 
in favor of simple rules.  Because rules may be more mechanically 
                                                          
 151. See Paul R. Michel, Foreword:  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must 
Evolve to Meet the Challenge Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1181 (1999) (observing an 
increase both in the number of cases filed in the Federal Circuit and the difficulty of 
the average case).  
 152. See Ellen Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act:  A 
Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 398 (1984) (describing the “mix of 
subject matter jurisdiction” at the Federal Circuit as “uncomfortable” because the 
various specialties do not necessarily relate to each other). 
 153. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the 
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002) (investigating the causes of 
patent law’s increasing complexity). 
 154. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 
12 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2002) (relating that district court judges misconstrue one-third of 
all patent claims appealed to the Federal Circuit). 
 155. See id. at 22 (quoting Chief Judge William G. Young as stating that seven of 
his nine cases appealed to the Federal Circuit were reversed, and that he is “not 
proud of that”). 
 156. See, e.g., In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1193-94, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1845, 1849-50 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (disagreeing with the position taken by the Patent and 
Trademark Office Commissioner over the applicability of section 112, paragraph six 
of the Patent Act to the PTO). 
 157. See, e.g., In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449-50, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691, 
1693-94  (Fed. Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with the position taken by the Patent and 
Trademark Office Commissioner regarding the appropriate standard for review for 
decisions of the PTO concerning patentability of claimed inventions). 
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applied than standards, they are said to decrease discretion and 
increase the likelihood that similarly situated individuals will be 
treated similarly.158  This advantage looms largest in decentralized 
administrative agencies such as the Patent Office.159  The patent-
examining corps consists of many hundreds of examiners, many with 
“full signatory” authority that effectively allows them to serve as one-
person patent offices.160  The presence of many different decision 
makers, and the absence of centralized oversight of patentability 
determinations, further suggests the desirability of rules over 
standards. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF FORMALISM IN PATENT LAW 
Many factors have contributed to the rise of adjudicative rule 
formalism within the patent law.  Judging by the tenor of the patent 
community, these new rules have for the large part been favorably 
received.  It seems that the hoped-for predictability promised by 
increasing Federal Circuit rulemaking has ranked quite high among 
the values of the patent bar.  Although concerns over the retracting 
doctrine of equivalents abound,161 patent professionals seem largely to 
have approved of the trend towards adjudicative rule formalism in 
patent law.162 
This Article sounds a cautionary note about the prevailing trend.  
In our rush to make the patent law more rulebound, we ought to 
consider the consequences more fully.  Certainty, predictability, and 
stability are high values indeed for any legal system, but they are not 
the only ones.  Innovation policy incorporates other values that 
present an uneasy fit with the Federal Circuit’s chosen rules.  Rules 
may be promulgated with the aim of decreasing burdens upon other 
                                                          
 158. See Landry, supra note 32. 
 159. See John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker:  Comparative Approaches 
to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 759 (2002) (describing the 
Patent and Trademark Office as a “Balkanized” group of “technology-based 
subdivisions”). 
 160. See id. (noting the autonomy and lack of uniformity within the Patent Office, 
and the difficulty in applying a single standard to differently served fields). 
 161. See Fields, supra note 7, at S5 (asserting that the degradation of the doctrine 
will incite “patent drafting and prosecution problems,” resulting in the reduced 
ability of small entities and individual entities to minimize costs). 
 162. See, e.g., Ronald Abramson, Ruling Promotes Certainty in Evaluation of Patents, 
N.J. L.J., Apr. 1997, at 37 (approving of recent trend towards limiting the doctrine of 
equivalents); Juan C. Gonzalez, The On-Sale Bar to Patentability:  The U.S. Supreme Court 
Sheds Some Light, 40 IDEA 83, 103 (2000) (“Pfaff is welcome relief after years of 
confusion . . . .”); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with 
Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 661-62 
(2001) (“The State Street decision is generally accepted as sound legal analysis and 
result . . . .”). 
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decision makers, but a closer analysis suggests that they might actually 
increase burdens upon the Patent Office in a dramatic fashion.  And, 
given what history teaches about the workings of the Federal Circuit, 
serious doubt should remain over whether the benefits of 
predictability and certainty can practically be achieved.  This Article 
next considers the potentially unattractive consequences of the 
recent spate of adjudicative rule formalism. 
A. Formalism and Innovation Policy 
1. Contract law and innovation policy 
The patent system has sometimes been analogized to the contract 
law.163  Inventors file applications and disclose inventions in exchange 
for the government’s grant of a proprietary interest.164  But beyond 
this simple likening, the patent law traditionally has borrowed little 
from contracts.  Exemplary is the Federal Circuit’s refusal to borrow 
perhaps the most apparent analogy, the construction of contracts, 
when constructing its Markman interpretational protocol for 
patents.165  This traditional stance seems appropriate.  It is not 
altogether clear why the legal mechanisms by which a promise is 
judged to be binding ought to control innovation policy. 
Yet in its Pfaff decision, the Supreme Court suddenly made the 
contract law much more salient to patents.  Recall that the Supreme 
Court declared that the on-sale bar is triggered when (1) the product 
is the subject of a commercial offer for sale and (2) the invention is 
ready for patenting.166  Interestingly, while the facts of Pfaff provided 
the Court ample opportunity to consider the second part of the test, 
                                                          
 163. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 127, 135-36 (2000) (arguing that the private law doctrine of contract 
can illuminate the operation of the patent system).  See generally William T. Kryger, 
The Doctrine of Equivalents Into the Year 2000:  The Line is Becoming Brighter for Some But 
Remains Dim for Others, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 203, 216-18 (1999) (analyzing 
the contract law and statutory law analogies developed to deal with the lack of patent 
law precedent). 
 164. See Kerr, supra note 163, at 134 (explaining that the patent laws represent an 
offer by Congress, the filing of a patent application corresponds to an acceptance of 
the offer by an inventor, and the government’s quid pro quo is the extension of a 
patent to the inventor). 
 165. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985-86, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1321, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1461 (1996) (stating that while extrinsic evidence and the subjective intent of 
the parties may be used to construe the terms of a contract, it would be 
inappropriate and impossible to use either in the patent context). 
 166. Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647 
(1998); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (surveying the facts and 
ruling in Pfaff). 
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there was little need to discuss the first.167  In the circumstances 
presented to the Supreme Court, Pfaff had sold sockets before he 
fabricated even a single prototype of his invention, not to mention 
tested them to see whether they were functional or practical.168  Pfaff’s 
remarkable technical abilities, as well as the confidence of his 
contracting partner, gave the Court ample opportunity to discuss 
whether an invention was “ready for patenting” when it had yet to 
advance beyond a sketch pad.169 
The facts of Pfaff provided far less fertile ground for discussing the 
new requirement that the product must be the subject of a 
commercial offer for sale.  There was no question that Pfaff had 
accepted a purchase order prior to the critical date.170  The Supreme 
Court announced its holding and quickly moved to the patentability 
issue.171  The Pfaff decision is notable for its absence of discussion of 
conflicting Federal Circuit case law that suggested the opposite 
holding:  that commercial activity not rising to the level of a formal 
offer for sale could nonetheless trigger the on-sale bar.172 
Subsequent decisions have suggested that the requirement of a 
commercial offer for sale has fallen prone to a common critique of 
rules:  promoting strategic behavior that extends just to the limit of 
the rule.173  In the context of the on-sale bar, the Pfaff holding seems 
to encourage inventors to skirt the policies of the on-sale bar by 
engaging in any number of activities that fall just short of a formal 
offer for sale. 
In one subsequent case, the inventor of an integrated circuit had, 
prior to the critical date, distributed advertisements, data sheets, and 
promotional information to customers, and had also received 
requests from sales representatives for product samples.174  The 
                                                          
 167. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1048, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 168. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 58, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (remarking that Pfaff 
regularly offered to sell new devices in commercial quantities before making or 
testing prototypes of the devices). 
 169. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (noting that at the time Pfaff offered to sell 
his invention in commercial quantities, he had only created “detailed engineering 
drawings that described the design, the dimensions, and the materials to be used” in 
producing his invention). 
 170. Id. at 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (observing that the acceptance of the 
purchase order before the critical date made it clear that a commercial offer had 
been made before the critical date). 
 171. Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 172. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1449, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that the requirement of a definite offer 
does not mandate “a definite offer in the contract sense,” but merely excludes 
“indefinite or nebulous discussions about a possible sale”). 
 173. See Schlag, supra note 19, at 384. 
 174. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1044, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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Federal Circuit held these activities did not trigger the on-sale bar 
because none of them constituted an offer for sale.175  Surely these 
activities implicated the policies underlying the on-sale bar, in 
particular concern for manipulation of patent term and the reliance 
interest of competitors.176  Yet adherents to the Pfaff test cannot 
consider them.  Simple as the Pfaff rule is, by failing to probe into the 
broader circumstances under which an invention can be injected into 
the public domain, the Pfaff test slights the innovation policies that 
should inform a sound patent law. 
2. Consequences of the patent blunderbuss 
It is difficult to imagine a regulatory environment more dynamic 
than that of innovative industry.  Technological, industrial, and 
marketplace conditions change at a dizzying pace in modern life.  
Making matters worse, the patent system is a blunderbuss.  The same 
Patent Act applies with equal force to all manner of inventions, no 
matter what the discipline in which they arose. 
These realities suggest two aspirations for decision-making within 
the patent system.  First, imposition of the patent system upon a 
particular industry calls for a careful judgment.  Among other factors, 
our desire for patent-induced innovation, the degree of 
concentration within a particular industry, our capacity to assess 
different sorts of innovations within the parameters of the patent law, 
and the ability of participants in particular industries to appropriate 
the benefits of their invention through non-legal mechanisms, should 
play a part in determinations of patent eligibility.177  Second, once a 
particular sphere of endeavor has been exposed to the patent system, 
it may be desirable to tailor patent doctrine to the ever-changing 
conditions of different industries.  It is apparent that standards, not 
rules, would offer courts sufficient flexibility to best achieve these 
goals.  A danger of adjudicative rule formalism is the rejection of 
tools necessary to adjust innovation policy to the specific 
circumstances of particular cases. 
                                                          
(BNA) 1225, 1226-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
 175. See id. at 1050-52, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230-32 (stating that the requests 
for samples may show that sales representatives were in contact with customers but 
do not prove that any offers were made, and that the promotional and other 
materials may have been preparing the market for future offers but did “not reveal 
the requisite intent to be bound, a sine qua non of an offer”). 
 176. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 177. See Richard H. Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on 
Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 109-10, 
138, 154-55 (1999). 
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Contemporary case law fails to reflect these aspirations.  The State 
Street Bank holding that anything useful is patentable178 surely presents 
a rule that is straightforward to apply, easy to predict, and 
evenhanded in its treatment of innovators in distinct fields of 
endeavor.  Yet the Federal Circuit, with its focus upon old judicial 
precedents and legislation, seemed disinterested in considering 
whether the patenting of business methods and other post-industrial 
inventions presents sound innovation policy.  As an increasing 
number of unlikely disciplines are awkwardly exposed to the patent 
system,179 the disadvantages of adjudicative rule formalism become 
more apparent. 
The interaction of the Johnson & Johnston public dedication rule 
with the patent law’s enablement requirement also demonstrates that 
rules often display too dull an edge.180  In order to obtain a patent, 
the Patent Act requires inventors to provide a technical disclosure 
sufficiently detailed such that others can practice the invention.181  
The enablement requirement theoretically applies with equal force to 
all inventions, but in fact is the subject of distinct administrative 
practices for different sorts of inventions.  A wholly-written 
description fulfills this enablement requirement for many sorts of 
inventions.  Knowledgeable persons may readily obtain components 
and compounds on the market and combine them to achieve 
patented machines, circuits, and chemical compositions. 
When an invention depends upon the use of living materials such 
as microorganisms or cultured cells, however, the enablement 
requirement becomes more difficult to fulfill.  A mere written 
account may not suffice to enable others conveniently to make and 
use the invention.  A sample of the biological materials is needed.  In 
such cases the patent applicant must submit these materials to one of 
a number of recognized biological repositories.  The case law 
recognizes that such deposits, accessible by interested members of 
the public, suffice to fulfill the enablement requirement.182 
                                                          
 178. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373, 
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 179. See John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
569, 573 (2002) (listing insurance, financial services, advertising, art, athletics, 
architecture, and macroeconomics as disciplines that may be difficult to analyze 
under existing rules). 
 180. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that a patentee 
cannot invoke the doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter that was 
disclosed to the public but not claimed). 
 181. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 182. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1609, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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Innovators from all disciplines keenly felt the public dedication 
doctrine of Johnson & Johnston, but in particular the biotechnology 
industry has been heavily impacted.  Inventors from the chemical, 
electrical, and mechanical arts may selectively draft written 
descriptions that claim just one component of a larger product or 
process.  In these fields, the effective requirement of Johnson & 
Johnston, that inventors claim all aspects of their invention, is less 
harsh.  Because the disclosure may not encompass a selected portion 
of a particular technology, drafting claims to the invention’s full 
breadth is more plausible. 
Inventors of biotechnological inventions fare less well under 
Johnson & Johnston.  In order to fulfill the patent law’s disclosure 
requirements they must place a sample of the invention in a public 
repository.  In light of the public disclosure doctrine, they must now 
also have the wherewithal to claim each and every aspect of that 
invention or be held to have disclaimed it.  Presenting a more 
selective disclosure and claim set is simply not an option.  A more 
flexible standard for the doctrine of equivalents would be able to 
account for the distinct disclosure obligations faced by 
biotechnologists.  Given the burdens it places upon an industry where 
the need for technological properties is said to be paramount,183 a 
rule of public dedication may simply be too blunt to present sound 
innovation policy. 
3. Common sense and the person of ordinary skill in the art 
With the statutory subject matter, novelty, and utility requirements 
presenting quite lenient patentability standards, nonobviousness 
remains the patent law’s most robust guardian of the public domain.  
Commentators have identified nonobviousness as serving several 
policy objectives.184  Among them is that nonobviousness ensures “a 
‘patent-free’ zone around the state of the art, allowing skilled 
technicians to complete routine work such as the straightforward 
substitution of materials, the ordinary streamlining of parts and 
technical processes, and the usual marginal improvements which 
occur as a technology matures.”185  Nonobviousness ensures that 
ordinary practitioners may practice their trade without interference 
                                                          
 183. See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and the Patent Law:  Fitting Innovation to the 
Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 22-23 (1991). 
 184. See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.:  New Standards for Patents, 
1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 301 (1966) (asserting that the nonobviousness test 
encourages innovation and limits the costs imposed on customers by patents). 
 185. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 310 (2d ed. 
2003). 
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from the patent system. 
To this end, a sound nonobviousness standard should reflect the 
capabilities of actual practitioners active in the field.  Although the 
nonobviousness standard has long been founded not upon the 
capabilities of an actual person, but of a hypothetical “person of 
‘ordinary skill in the art,’”186 that fictitious practitioner should be as 
closely akin to the capabilities of skilled artisans as possible.  
Otherwise, the nonobviousness standards will fall short of its policy 
objectives and inappropriately restrict the public domain. 
By instructing the Patent Office to avoid reliance upon “common 
knowledge and common sense” in its decision making, the Federal 
Circuit risks unduly diminishing the nonobviousness requirement.187  
Trained scientists, engineers and other practitioners are seldom so 
dull-witted as to unvaryingly require the specific, step-by-step 
combination of elements from the prior art.  Indeed, it is not 
uncommon for the Federal Circuit to cite to common sense in its 
opinions, regarding such varied issues as claim interpretation,188 
indirect infringement,189 and reduction to practice.190  A more 
nuanced standard, accounting for the level of ordinary skill in the art, 
the predictability of the art, and other salient factors would better 
account for the technical environment in which inventors and 
ordinary artisans alike find themselves.  But the stringent rule of Lee 
threatens to make nonobviousness a mechanical determination, too 
closely akin to the novelty standard and too ineffective to protect the 
public domain. 
                                                          
 186. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 697, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
865, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 187. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (holding that determinations of patentability must be based on evidence, that 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences decisions must be based on “objective 
analysis, proper authority, and reasoned findings,” and that “common knowledge 
and common sense” are not substitutes for either requirement). 
 188. See Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971-72, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the doctrine of claim 
differentiation is grounded in the common sense notion that when different claims 
use different words and phrases, the claims were intended to have different 
meanings and scope). 
 189. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1496 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding an alleged infringer not liable under an 
inducement of infringement theory because it would have defied common sense for 
the defendant to have induced the infringing acts). 
 190. See Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1115, 1119 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (explaining that the level of testing required to demonstrate reduction to 
practice is based on the common sense approach of requiring more testing in 
situations with many uncertainties and allowing less testing when fewer variables are 
involved). 
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B. Formalism and Patent Administration 
The Patent Office has at last admitted that it is under siege.191  In 
1991, inventors presented 177,830 applications to the Patent Office.192  
By 2001 this number had increased to 345,732 applications,193 and 
substantial increases are projected for the foreseeable future.194  As 
worrying as these figures are, they do not fully convey the troubling 
environment in which our patent administrators operate.  As 
technology has advanced, applications increasingly concern 
inventions of extraordinary complexity.195  An ever more sophisticated 
patent bar has also adopted more elaborate prosecution strategies, as 
evidenced by the growing number of patents that incorporate dozens 
and sometimes hundreds of claims.196  The Patent Office has also 
faced difficult financial circumstances.  Congress has increasingly 
diverted Patent Office revenue in order to address shortfalls in the 
general budget.197   The result has been an increase in the pendency 
of applications, persistent accounts claiming that patent quality has 
suffered, and calls for a dramatic rethinking of the manner in which 
patents are examined and approved.198 
In light of these difficulties, concern for patent administration 
would seem an especially appropriate consideration for intellectual 
property policy makers.  Indeed, the simple rules now favored by the 
Federal Circuit may appear to be an appropriate response to the 
                                                          
 191. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, The 21st Century Strategic Plan (Feb. 3, 
2003), at 3 [hereinafter Strategic Plan] (reporting that “[t]oday, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is under siege.”), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan_03feb2003.pdf. 
 192. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Year 1963—
2001 (2002), at 1, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/ 
taf/us_stat.pdf. (last modified Feb. 3, 2003). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Strategic Plan, supra note 191, at 1 (noting the estimated seven million 
pending patent applications and a yearly workload increase of twenty to thirty 
percent). 
 195. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 153, at 80 (observing that although an 
increasing number of complex inventions originate from “high-tech” industries, such 
as software, semiconductors, computers, and biotechnology, there has also been an 
increased flow of complex inventions from more traditional industries, such as 
medical devices and automotive technologies). 
 196. See id. at 81 (noting that patents “issued in the 1990s contained 
approximately 50% more claims than patents issued in the 1970s”). 
 197. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System:  A 
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 317 (2001) [hereinafter Thomas, 
Collusion and Collective Action] (noting that the income from the patent fee surcharge, 
intended by Congress to make the Patent Office entirely user-funded, was diverted to 
a Treasury account and, in less than a decade, over $234 million was diverted from 
the Patent Office to other government programs). 
 198. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002). 
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current crisis in patent administration.  Simple rules should 
streamline patent acquisition procedures by being easily applied and 
resistant to discretion.  Yet a closer look at recent legal developments 
reveals a more complex picture.  Rather than lift Patent Office 
burdens, recent doctrinal developments may actually be increasing 
them, both in terms of enlarging the number of applications filed 
and the costs of the administrative process itself. 
1. Increasing the filing rate 
The Federal Circuit’s permissive jurisprudence of patent eligibility 
is exemplary of how the promulgation of a simple rule by a well-
meaning judiciary can lead to unintended consequences.  In State 
Street Bank,199 the Federal Circuit was arguably motivated by its past 
difficulties in identifying the subject matter appropriate for 
patenting.  A simple “tangible result” rule would seemingly decrease 
Patent Office workload by allowing examiners to avoid the 
metaphysical inquires that sometimes accompanied the Freeman-
Walter-Abele200 standard and other predecessor tests.  But the effect has 
instead been to increase filings, as firms in industries that were once 
strangers to the patent system have begun the systematic 
formalization of their intellectual properties.201  A rule likely 
promulgated out of sympathy for Patent Office workload has, in fact, 
intensified demands upon our patent administrators.202 
The dwindling doctrine of equivalents also places growing strains 
upon the Patent Office.  By decreasing the ability of patentees to 
assert the doctrine, the Federal Circuit hopes to increase notice and 
certainty within innovative industries.  Yet experience teaches that 
this notice will come at a price.  Put in rudimentary terms, applicants 
may respond by procuring numerous small patents instead of a single 
big one.  Inventors must now construct detailed claim sets, perhaps 
over multiple patents, rather than employ more limited claims along 
with an expectation of judicial application of the doctrine of 
                                                          
 199. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 200. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Jennifer A. Albert & Emerson V. Briggs, III, Strategies of Tech Business 
Include Utility Patents, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B23 (reporting that “[t]he PTO has 
been inundated with patent applications during the past two years and can barely 
keep up.  It is generally understood that this increase in filings results from an influx 
of computer, software, and Internet-based applications in the wake of the Federal 
Circuit’s holding in State Street.”). 
 202. See id. (observing that encouragement of computer-dependent businesses to 
seek the broader but more difficult to obtain protection of utility patents did less to 
stem the influx of patent applications than it did to promote greater complexity in 
patent applications). 
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equivalents.  Patent administrators will bear the brunt of a policy shift 
that increases the transaction costs of patent acquisition and removes 
flexibility from enforcement litigation. 
More than other Federal Circuit opinions pertaining to the 
doctrine of equivalents, Johnson & Johnston203 addresses the impact of 
its holding upon the Patent Office.  The results were not especially 
encouraging.  The court expressly encouraged applicants to file 
continuation and reissue applications to ensure that no disclosed 
subject matter goes unclaimed.204  The opinion also implicitly 
encourages applicants to file more claims so that no portion of the 
disclosure is considered to be disclaimed.205  The Federal Circuit 
decided Johnson & Johnston recently, and its impact has yet to be felt.  
There should be little doubt that the best the Patent Office can hope 
for is equipoise in its workload, and quite possibly could expect 
significantly greater demands from patent applicants. 
2. Heightening the burdens of examination 
Even as recent doctrinal developments increase the number of 
patent applications, they may also raise the administrative costs of 
processing these applications.  The patenting of business methods 
and other post-industrial inventions has proven especially 
burdensome to the Patent Office because it lacks institutional 
experience in these fields.  Other advanced technologies, such as 
biotechnology, semiconductors, or polymer chemistry, descended 
naturally from their predecessors.  No such antecedent basis informs 
Patent Office practices and expertise concerning post-industrial 
inventions.206 
The Patent Office has endeavored to meet this challenge.  It has 
sponsored a roundtable discussion, pronounced an initiative, and 
altered its ordinary examination practices in order to come up to 
speed as quickly as its difficult circumstances allow.207  Whether the 
examination of post-industrial inventions will ever be on par with 
advancements in traditionally patented fields still remains an open 
question.  While the norms of the scientific method encourage 
                                                          
 203. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 204. Id. at 1055, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234 (holding that “[w]ithin two years 
from the grant of the original patent, a patentee may file a reissue application and 
attempt to enlarge the scope of the original claims to include the disclosed but 
previously unclaimed subject matter.”). 
 205. See id. (providing that “a patentee can file a separate application claiming the 
disclosed subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) . . . .”). 
 206. See Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action, supra note 197, at 318-19. 
 207. See Brenda Sandburg, Business Method Patents Come Under Increased Scrutiny, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 31, 2000, at 4. 
FINALTHOMASA.PRINTER.DOC 8/15/2003  1:43 PM 
806 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:771 
publication and disclosure of advancements in biology, chemistry, 
and physics, no such principle guides the world of commerce.  
Advances there are maintained in the practices of commercial 
enterprises and the heads of business persons, and it is not entirely 
sure that the patent system will alter this traditional norm.208  As a 
result, Patent Office difficulties in located prior art will likely prove 
longstanding. 
The diminishing nonobviousness requirement increases pressures 
upon patent administrators to discover prior art references of great 
specificity.  This consequence can be best appreciated when viewed in 
light of the Patent Office’s sweeping statutory obligations. When 
enacting the patent code, Congress charged the Patent Office with 
knowledge of the entire state of the art across all the disciplines that 
comprise patentable subject matter.  The Patent Act commands 
examiners to locate all prior patents and publications published 
anywhere in the world, in any language; all domestic sales and uses, 
even where they have not been documented; and even information 
that has been maintained in secrecy.209  The requirement that 
examiners sift through this vast universe of knowledge to find a 
single, anticipatory reference is one that often cannot be practically 
achieved. 
The nonobviousness standard has traditionally ameliorated the 
harshness of this task.  Examiners need not rely solely upon the 
novelty requirement and a scorched earth prior art search for a 
single, ideal reference.  Instead, they may employ teachings from 
several references that are more readily obtainable, brought together 
from the perspective of skilled persons within the field.  This 
flexibility substitutes for a single, identical reference that may exist 
somewhere in the world, but simply cannot be readily retrieved 
within the time and budget restraints of the Patent Office.  
Nonobviousness allows the Patent Office to maintain its role as a 
guardian of the public domain despite its challenging workload and 
difficult financial circumstances. 
The Federal Circuit’s recently imposed evidentiary requirements, 
exemplified by such opinions as Lee,210 threaten to remove this 
flexibility.  Examiners must now find not only each element of the 
claimed invention within the prior art, but demonstrate that a skilled 
                                                          
 208. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 269 (2000). 
 209. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 210. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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artisan would have been motivated to combine them.211  To the extent 
that Lee requires a showing from the prior art of a motivation to 
combine, examiners must effectively possess fully anticipatory 
reference in order to make an obviousness rejection.212  By converting 
an administrative ideal into an everyday practice, the Federal Circuit 
has made it far more difficult for the Patent Office to reject 
applications. 
Lee’s demand that the Patent Office Board provide “full and 
reasoned explanations”213 of each decision also places great pressures 
upon the Patent Office.  In recent years, the Board has experienced 
backlogs in its challenging workload.  If the Board’s Administrative 
Patent Judges must present a fulsome articulation of its decision in 
every case, it seems likely that the Board will fall still farther behind.  
Notably, the Federal Circuit issues many of its opinions in brief, 
conclusory, nonprecedential form.214  It is at least questionable 
whether the Federal Circuit is holding the Board to a standard it does 
not meet itself. 
Shifts in the Federal Circuit’s thinking on the doctrine of 
equivalents have also impacted patent prosecution.  At its best, patent 
prosecution encourages a dialogue between applicant and examiner 
about the appropriate scope of the claims in light of the prior art.215  
In view of Festo216 and other decisions that emphasize a patent’s 
prosecution history, contemporary patent acquisition proceedings 
have become more confrontational.  Concern for the adverse 
consequences of prosecution history estoppel have made applicants’ 
responses more formulaic and decreased their willingness to amend 
claims.  Festo’s primary impact may indeed lie not so much in 
infringement litigation, but in prosecution, as applicants engage in  
                                                          
 211. See id. at 1345, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (holding that “[t]he board 
cannot rely on conclusory statements when dealing with particular combinations of 
prior art and specific claims, but must set forth the rationale on which it relies.”). 
 212. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 213. See id. at 1342, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (holding that “[f]or judicial 
review to be meaningfully achieved within these strictures, the agency tribunal must 
present a full and reasoned explanation of its decision.”). 
 214. See Elizabeth M. Horton, Selective Publication and the Authority of Precedent in the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1693 (1995) (noting that the 
relaxed standard allows judges to allocate more time to drafting opinions with 
precedent-creating opportunities). 
 215. See generally John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies:  
The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 188-
89 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Prosecution Histories] (describing the applicant/ 
patent examiner exchange when an inventor seeks patent protection). 
 216. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
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more adversarial prosecution practices and have enhanced incentives 
to appeal examiner decisions.217 
C. Formalism and Certainty 
Finally, it is also appropriate to question whether adjudicative rule 
formalism will achieve its goals of certainty, predictability, and 
doctrinal stability.218  Undoubtedly some legal issues, such as whether 
a particular invention is eligible for patenting or whether a 
competitor’s product infringes under the doctrine of equivalents, are 
more easily answered today than a decade ago. Yet historical 
experience suggests that we view Federal Circuit rulemaking with a 
healthy skepticism.  Over its twenty-year history, the court has not 
always followed its own mandates with the rigor we might expect. 
Product-by-process claims illustrate one of the more notable 
examples of disobedience. Rather than recite the structure of the 
claimed product, this claim format instead describes the product by 
the method through which it was made.219  Some ambiguity has 
surrounded the scope of such claims.  One Federal Circuit three-
judge panel held that product-by-process claims covered the product, 
no matter whether the claimed method of making that product was 
employed or not.220  Less than one year later, a second Federal Circuit 
panel decided differently.221  According to the panel in the later 
Atlantic Thermoplastics decision, the original panel had not properly 
understood controlling Supreme Court precedent.  The memorable 
lines of Judge Rich, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, 
captured the mood of the moment:  “[I]t is mutiny.  It is heresy.  It is 
illegal.”222 
Other authors have catalogued additional instances of this sort.223  
In addition to pointing to higher authority, Federal Circuit panels 
                                                          
 217. See generally supra note 206 and accompanying text; Thomas, Prosecution 
Histories, supra note 215, at 203 (asserting that patent examiners only rarely hold 
legal qualifications; further, admission to represent others before the patent bar is 
not restricted to attorneys). 
 218. See generally Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 150, at 791. 
 219. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 185, at 544. 
 220. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583, 
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that “[s]ince claims must 
be construed the same way for validity and for infringement, the correct reading of 
product-by-process claims is that they are not limited to product prepared by the 
process set forth in the claims.”). 
 221. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 222. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1801, 1802 (Fed. Cir. 1992).(Rich, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 223. See Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 150, at 791. 
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have sometimes distinguished an earlier rule based upon the facts of 
the decision that formed it;224 declared a different policy at play under 
the facts at hand;225 or simply engrafted an exception on the rule.226  
That the Federal Circuit has not always observed its own rules calls 
more for the refinement than the rejection of its current rule-making 
drive.  Still, the Federal Circuit may need to foster a newfound 
discipline in order to maintain the many rules it has recently 
established.  The coming years will reveal the success of this 
endeavor. 
CONCLUSION 
In a legal climate where diverse strands of Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence appear to be moving in different directions, the theme 
of adjudicative rules formalism presents a unifying explanation.  To 
the extent this theory is accurate and possesses predictive power, 
some cautious forecasts about the near future of patent law are in 
order.  First, the court will likely continue its trend of declaring issues 
frequently before it to arise in law rather than fact.227  Given the 
prevailing trend in the Federal Circuit, the doctrine of equivalents 
appears a likely candidate for such treatment.228  Second, the Federal 
Circuit will augment the collection of issues it chooses to decide 
under its own law, rather than the law of a regional circuit court of 
appeals.229  Finally, as applicants continue to find patentability criteria 
more readily satisfied, so too will patentees find the doctrine of 
equivalents less availing.  The U.S. patent system will continue to 
move towards a regime where many patents issue, but few are 
                                                          
 224. See Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1334, 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (declining to apply the good faith 
purchaser for value rule to a non-exclusive license). 
 225. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1314, 51 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996), based 
upon perceived benefits of expert testimony in patent claim interpretation). 
 226. Compare In re Sang Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (stating general rule that in order to combine teachings of the prior art 
for purpose of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, there must be objective evidence 
of record based on a thorough factual inquiry), with In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 65 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (concluding it was appropriate to assume 
that artisans possess the motivation to determine the optimal combination where the 
prior art teaches materials made out of a combination of ingredients). 
 227. See Robert D. Fram & Sarah E. Mitchell, Federal Circuit Sees Fit to Streamline 
Litigation But Converting More Issues to Matters of Law May Not Result in Hoped-For 
‘Predictability’, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 20, 1997, at C25 (reporting that “the court has shown 
an inclination to convert a wider range of issues into matters of law.”). 
 228. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 119, at 955. 
 229. See Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1182, 37 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1707, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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awarded a scope of protection beyond their literal wording.  That this 
system might resemble an earlier era of the Japanese patent system, 
with its patent thickets and frustrating judgment of noninfringment, 
may give American readers appropriate pause. 
More sure is that in a time of sweeping change, U.S. patent law is in 
many ways becoming more certain.  The Federal Circuit’s ongoing 
pursuit of doctrinal stability has led to maximalist decision making 
that has specified considerable legal rules in advance of their 
application.  As we assess the court’s movement into adjudicative 
rules formalism, we would do well to remember that the goals of 
certainty and predictability rank high among the list of legal 
aspirations.  But there are other values for the patent system as well.  
The central concern of a sound innovation policy and due regard for 
administrative ramifications, along with a healthy skepticism over 
whether certainty can be practically achieved, suggests the desirability 
of more nuanced alternatives.  In days soon to come, the dynamic 
field of innovation will surely test the wisdom of the court’s newly 
forged rules, as well as the resolve of its jurists to abide by them. 
